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Privacy and Search Engines: Forgetting or Contextualizing? 
 
SYLVIA DE MARS* AND PATRICK O’CALLAGHAN** 
 
This paper considers the much-criticised ‘right to be forgotten’ in the context of the 
European Court of Justice’s judgment in the Google Spain case.  It defends the ‘right 
to be forgotten’ as a metaphor that can provide us with a better understanding of the 
particular privacy concerns of the search-engine age and their interaction with the 
freedom to access information.  In unpacking this metaphor and putting it to use, the 
paper draws on Erving Goffman’s idea of ‘information games’ and Helen 
Nissenbaum’s theory of ‘contextual integrity’. While supporting the principles that 
underpin the Google Spain judgment, the article rejects the Court’s binary approach 
of ‘forgetting’ versus ‘remembering’ personal information.  Instead, it argues that the 
EU legislator should introduce more nuanced means of addressing modern privacy 
concerns.  By establishing two remedies—‘delisting’ or ‘reordering’, depending on the 
nature of the information in question—online information flows can be adjusted so as 
to preserve both the right to privacy and the freedom to access information in more 




Rarely has a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) triggered the 
sort of media frenzy that followed the case of Google Spain and its purported establishment of 
a ‘right to be forgotten’ on the internet.1 Charges that the decision would lead to censorship of 
speech featured prominently in public discourse. Reactions of this sort are in many ways 
understandable. As Bernal has argued, the terminology causes or ‘provokes emotional and 
instinctive reactions.’2 Our instincts tell us that the words ‘law’ and ‘forgetting’ should not 
mix. Requiring us to forget or erase details from public record is the sort of activity we might 
ordinarily associate with totalitarian regimes. Here, as Hitchens puts it, ideology seeks to ‘begin 
the human story over again’, becoming a ‘cult of the now’.3 Consider in this light the Khmer 
Rouge’s ruthless attempts to bring about ‘year zero’.4 Thoughts such as these generate, as 
Ricoeur rightly emphasises, ‘uneasiness’ in us.5  
However, the Court’s decision in Google Spain is not as radical as it first appears.6 
Rather, it is more nuanced, focussing on the special status of search engines as a primary means 
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1 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v AEPD [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317; see, for instance, A. Travis and C. 
Arthur, ‘EU court backs “right to be forgotten”: Google must amend results on request’ Guardian, 13 May 2014 
< http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results>. 
2 P. Bernal, ‘A Right to Delete’ (2011) 2(2) European Journal of Law and Technology 
<http://ejlt.org/article/view/75/144>. 
3 C. Hitchens, Arguably (2011) 162. 
4 See further F. Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (1978). 
5 P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (2004) 501. 
6 See also O. Lynskey, ‘Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja  
González’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Rev. 522, at 528; A. Roughton, ‘Google and the “right to be forgotten” – 
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of accessing information in the digital age. Understood in this way, the Court’s position is not 
simply that individuals should have a licence to erase information from the internet at will. 
Rather, the decision seeks to ensure that when interests in forgetting/being forgotten are at 
stake, certain types of information should not be so easily and readily accessible. This does not 
mean that the information cannot be accessed in other ways; rather, that in the absence of a 
public interest, such information should not be instantly available by typing a person’s name 
into a search engine.7   
In this paper, we aim to explain and justify the principles that lie behind the Court’s 
decision in Google Spain. After detailing the judgment, we argue that the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
is a useful metaphor as it helps us ‘make sense’ of our experiences of technological 
development and the associated social change. Indeed, there are two reasons in particular why 
the ‘right’ is so helpful. First, the distinct privacy challenges of the 21st century are revealed 
once we contrast the ‘right’ with another metaphor: digital technology’s capacity for ‘perfect 
memory’. Second, because the terminology of a ‘right to be forgotten’ is instinctively 
contentious, it forces us to consider the implications of data erasure for the freedom to access 
information.  
Building on the work of Erving Goffman and Helen Nissenbaum, amongst others, we 
argue that sometimes it is better to obtain limited or reordered results from an internet search 
engine as long as this preserves ‘contextual integrity’. Though we identify problems with a 
blunt-force application of these ideas about ‘forgetting’ and ‘being forgotten’, we argue that 
properly developed remedies that strive for ‘contextual integrity’ have the potential to be 
important tools in protecting both the rights to privacy and information on the internet.     
 
GOOGLE SPAIN V AEPD 
 
Google Spain is the culmination of five years of effort by Mr. Mario Costeja González 
to have information about himself removed from Google’s search results. His journey 
commenced in 2009, when he discovered that upon searching for his name through Google, 
Google produced links to two Spanish newspaper announcements from 1998.  These 
announcements concerned a real-estate auction of property owned by Mr. Costeja, prompted 
by his social security debts.  In short, anyone searching for Mr. Costeja’s name immediately 
found these twelve year old notices about his very much historical debts.8   
Mr. Costeja’s complaint to the Spanish Data Protection Authority (DPA), the AEPD, 
advanced two separate requests: removal of the original notices from the newspaper’s archive, 
or alternatively, removal of the links to these notices from Google’s search results for his 
name.9 What this suggests is that Mr. Costeja was most concerned about the fact that this 
information was easily and instantly available whenever anybody put his name into the search 
engine; not necessarily that it was available in a newspaper archive, where it was unlikely to 
be found by any internet user not specifically looking for it.10 
In July 2010, the AEPD upheld Mr. Costeja’s claim against Google, and consequently 
called on Google to withdraw the data from their index and render future access to these links 
                                                          
setting the record straight’ (2014) 14(8) Privacy & Data Protection 6; J. Jones, ‘Control-alter-delete: the “right 
to be forgotten”’ (2014) 36(9) European Intellectual Property Rev. 595. 
7 See P. Korenhof et al, ‘Timing the Right to Be Forgotten: A Study into “Time” as a Factor in Deciding About 
Retention or Erasure of Data’ in Reforming European Data Protection Law, in eds. S Gutwirth et al (2015) 183. 
8 Opinion of Advocate-General Jääskinen in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v AEPD [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, paras 18-19; Google Spain, op. cit., n 1, para 14. 
9 AG Opinion in Google Spain, id., para 21; Google Spain, op. cit., n 1, para 15. 
10 ‘Ease of access’ is what worries internet users with privacy concerns the most; see A.H. Stuart, ‘Google 
Search Results: Buried if Not Forgotten’ (2014) 15 North Carolina J. of Law and Technology 463, at 467. 
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to the newspaper announcements impossible.11  Google appealed the AEPD’s decision before 
the Audienca Nacional, which referred questions to the ECJ on the territorial scope of the EU’s 
Data Protection Directive, the nature of Google’s search engine’s activities, and finally, if the 
Directive establishes a ‘right to be forgotten’ for persons in Mr. Costeja’s position.12   
The Court’s ruling on all three of these questions has been discussed in detail at this 
time.13 For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of the judgment is its particular focus on 
the role that search engines play in our ability to access information and how they impact on 
our right to privacy.  The Court highlighted that search engines have a far more extensive effect 
on data subjects’ right to privacy than many publishers (such as newspaper archives), on 
account of their ability to disseminate information instantaneously and world-wide.  The Court 
also found that this dissemination of personal data is not a process that Google only permits, 
but rather one it controls: consequently, it found that Google bears responsibility for ensuring 
that when it builds search result pages, it satisfies the requirements to protect personal data and 
private life set out in the Directive.14  The Court thus concluded that Google is responsible for 
removing links from its search engine where Articles 12(b) (establishing the right to erase, 
block, or rectify information, particularly where it is incomplete or inaccurate) or 14(a) 
(enabling data subjects to ‘object at any time, on compelling legitimate grounds relating to 
[their] particular situation[s], to the processing of data relating to [them]....’) of the Directive 
apply.15   
Next, in considering if the Directive establishes a ‘right to be forgotten’, the Court 
found that the right to have data erased, blocked or rectified under Article 12(b) exists for data 
subjects whenever any of the conditions of Article 6 are not met.16 Article 6’s obligations 
prohibit inaccurate and incomplete data, but they also cover data that is inadequate, irrelevant, 
disproportionate, not kept up to date, or kept for longer than is necessary.17  When a data subject 
files a request under Article 12(b) because data provided by a search engine’s index is no longer 
‘up to date’ or kept for longer than is necessary, as Mr. Costeja did in Google Spain, the Court 
found that Article 12(b) read in conjunction with Article 6 obliges a search engine to erase 
these links.18 
The Court acknowledged that the referred questions involve a weighing of competing 
fundamental rights: these are the rights of data protection (Article 8 CFR) and respect for 
private life (Article 7 CFR) on the one hand, and the rights to freedom of expression and 
information (Article 11 CFR) and the freedom to conduct business (Article 16).19  However, it 
found that in cases of this nature, Article 7 and 8 rights will generally outweigh Article 11 
rights.  Its only caveat was that ‘[the nature of the balancing of the rights] may … depend … 
on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life 
                                                          
11 Google Spain, op. cit., n 1, para 17. 
12 id., paras 18-20. 
13 See Lynskey, op. cit., n 6; H. Hijmans, ‘Right to Have Links Removed: Evidence of Effective Data 
Protection’ (2014) 21 Maastricht J. of European and Comparative Law 555; D. Lindsay, ‘The “Right to be 
Forgotten” by Search Engines under Data Privacy Law: A Legal Analysis of the Costeja Ruling’ (2014) 6 J. of 
Media Law 159; S. Stokes, ‘A decision to quickly forget: Google Spain and Google on the right to be forgotten’ 
(2014) 25 Entertainment Law Rev. 233; E. Kelsey, ‘Google Spain SL and Google Inc v AEPD and Mario 
Costeja González: protection of personal data, freedom of information and the “right to be forgotten”’ (2014) 4 
European Human Rights Law Rev. 395; G. Sartor, ‘Search Engines as Controllers: Inconvenient Implications of 
a Questionable Classification’ (2014) 21 Maastricht J. of European and Comparative Law 564. 
14 Google Spain, op. cit., n 1, paras 35, 38, 80, 87. 
15 id., para 88. 
16 id., paras 72, 94. 
17 id., para 72. 
18 id., para 99. 
19 id., para 97. 
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and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in 
particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.’20 
The Court concluded in Google Spain that as the information in question was 12 years 
old, no longer relevant, and as Mr. Costeja is not a public figure, the Directive enables Mr. 
Costeja to request that Google no longer link to it.21 However, while the referring court asked 
explicitly if Articles 12(b) and 14(a) amount to a ‘right to be forgotten’, the Court did not use 
those words at any point, finding only that Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive allow data 
subjects to contact a search engine and request it to edit or erase search engine results that are 
inaccurate, incomplete, outdated, or no longer relevant. 
The Court thus did not create a general ‘right to be forgotten’; rather, it read existing 
EU legislation as containing the right to have certain types of information removed from search 
engine results.  Controversy has stemmed from the attachment of the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
label to a judgment that was, in reality, more reserved.22  The Court focused on the specific 
function of the search engine on the modern internet and how it impacts the privacy of internet 
users.  The Court concluded that search engines must have distinct, separate responsibilities 
from other data controllers on the internet.  Far from being a radical new idea, the Court’s 
position, as we will argue next, is rooted in older and more familiar accounts of privacy and its 
interaction with competing rights.  
 
THE CONTENT OF A ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’ 
 
1. The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ as a Metaphor 
 
While the idea of a ‘right to be forgotten’ features in the doctrine and legal scholarship 
of several civil law legal systems in Europe,23 it is only in recent years that the term has gained 
prominence at the EU level.  In 2012, the European Commission published a proposal for a 
new Data Protection Regulation which, in Article 17, extended the ability for data subjects to 
object to data processing under EU law.  In the original proposal, Article 17 was titled the ‘right 
to be forgotten and to erasure’.24 However, few commentators thought that the terminology 
was suitable. Koops, for example, thought that using the label, a ‘right to be forgotten’, was an 
‘error of judgement’. He went on: 
 
‘The term “right to be forgotten” has been floated as an appealing ideal for doing something about the persistence 
of embarrassing data on the Internet, but it is pretty obviously a misnomer; not only is it very difficult to have all 
copies of data removed from the Internet, but removing content from the Internet also cannot be equated to people 
actually forgetting what they have already read.’25 
 
Similar concerns led the UK DPA, the Information Commissioner’s Office, to conclude that 
the label might generate unrealistic expectations. More specifically, the ICO was concerned 
that individuals might become ‘disillusioned’ if it emerged that the right was ‘limited in 
                                                          
20 id., para 81. 
21 id., para 99. 
22 See, similarly, Lynskey, op. cit., n 6, p. 528. 
23 See G. Brüggemeier et al. (ed.) Personality Rights in European Tort Law (2010) case 3. 
24 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(2012) COM(2012)11 final. 




practice’. 26   Indeed, perhaps for reasons of this sort, EU-level negotiations on the Data 
Protection Regulation have re-branded Article 17 to the ‘Right to erasure (“right to be 
forgotten”)’.27   
Whatever the limitations of using the term in the text of legislation, we argue that ‘the 
right to be forgotten’ is a helpful metaphor in attempting to better understand the complexities 
of the interaction between privacy and the freedom to access information in the digital age.28 
Markou, in an extensive critique of the term, acknowledges that the term itself may be a 
metaphor, and concedes that metaphors ‘[can help translate] new technological phenomena 
into legal issues (or rules)’. 29  Even so, she appears unconvinced that the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
is the right metaphor to use in this context. On her account: 
 
‘whereas metaphors are, in the legal field, used to render difficult-to-grasp phenomena more understandable, the 
choice of the “forgotten” label strikingly seems to have involved the opposite. Indeed, what was at stake is 
something as concrete and understandable as “data erasure”, which has been described by reference to 
“forgetting”, a complicated and difficult-to-grasp psychological process!’30 
 
However, in our view, despite (or perhaps even because of) the fact that forgetting is a 
‘complicated and difficult-to-grasp psychological process’, the terminology of a ‘right to be 
forgotten’ is extremely helpful in explaining why the tool of data erasure is needed in the first 
place. 
It is instructive here to consider the etymology of ‘metaphor’. ‘Metaphor’ comes from 
the Greek meta (across) and pherein (carry).31  ‘The essence of metaphor’, as Lakoff and 
Johnson explain in their classic account, ‘is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing 
in terms of another.’32 The metaphor carries a meaning from one context across to another, 
and thus the right metaphor for a given situation helps us to ‘make sense’ of our experiences 
(thereby giving them a ‘coherent structure’).33  
Over the past few decades, we have witnessed rapid and extensive technological 
development (and ensuing social change). But we find it difficult to make sense of our 
experiences of this rapid change. This is because while cyberspace constantly expands, the 
capacity of the individual brain to process this information stays the same or barely changes.34 
Moreover, given how deeply embedded we are in this social change, it is difficult to achieve 
the necessary distance from it in order to measure the ‘emotional, psychological, and existential 
price’ we pay for our reliance on the Internet.35  
                                                          
26 Information Commissioner’s Office, Initial Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposals for a Revised 
Data Protection Legislative Framework, (27 February 2012) < http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=xb997> 13; see 
also M. Kuchewsky, ‘The Right to be Forgotten – the fog finally lifts’ (2012) 12 Privacy & Data Protection 10. 
27 European Council Presidency, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) [first reading] - Confirmation of the final compromise with a vue 
[sic] to agreement (15321/15) <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15321-2015-INIT/en/pdf> 
28 For an influential account of the place of forgetting in the digital age, see V. Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The 
Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (2009). 
29 C. Markou, ‘The “Right to be Forgotten”: Ten Reasons Why It Should Be Forgotten’ in Gutwirth et al. (eds.), 
op. cit., n 7, p. 221. 
30 id. 
31 I. McGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary (2009) 116. 
32 G Lakoff and M Johnson, Metaphors we live by (1980) 5. 
33 id., p. 139; on a metaphor’s potential to shape our thinking and behaviour, see also, Schön’s work on 
‘generative metaphors’ and ‘framing’: D Schön, ‘Generative metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in 
Social Policy’ in Metaphor and Thought, ed. A Ortony (1993, 2nd edn). 
34 F. Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy (2009) 100-101.  
35 id., p. 90. 
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Understood in this way, while the metaphor of a ‘right to be forgotten’ may well prove 
to be too ‘woolly’ to feature in a legislative text,36 we believe that it can help us conceptualise 
technological development and the associated social change in ways that  ‘make sense’ of our 
experiences. Indeed, the metaphor is especially useful for two reasons, which we now turn to 
consider. Firstly, once we introduce the ‘right to be forgotten’ as an antithesis to another 
metaphor, digital technology’s capacity for ‘perfect memory’, our attention becomes drawn to 
the pertinent privacy concerns of today. Second, because the ‘right to be forgotten’ is at the 
same time instinctively contentious, it brings into sharp focus concerns about what data erasure 
might mean for the freedom to access information. 
 
2. Forgetting and ‘Perfect Memory’: The Dual Nature of a ‘Right to be Forgotten’ 
 
The first reason why the metaphor of the ‘right to be forgotten’ is helpful is because it 
brings to our attention the particular privacy concerns of the 21st century. These concerns are 
revealed once we contrast the ‘right to be forgotten’ with another commonly-used metaphor: 
digital technology’s capacity for ‘perfect memory’.  
Today’s ‘technological landscape’, as Nissenbaum explains, provides capacities to 
monitor, track and retain personal information in ways we could not even imagine just a few 
years ago.37 Technology allows us to aggregate and analyse this information, which we can 
then disseminate and publish, quickly and easily.38 Once published, this information may prove 
difficult to delete.39 It is against this backdrop that scholars have written about the capacity for 
permanent data retention, or what Bellia calls the ‘architecture of perfect memory’.40 While the 
internet does not currently retain every single piece of information forever,41 the metaphor of 
‘perfect memory’ helps us to ‘make sense’ of the implications of technological development. 
In doing so, scholars have sought to investigate the implications of ‘perfect memory’ both for 
individual well-being and society as a whole. 42  They argue that we risk suffering from 
‘excessive remembering’ in our connected lives. 43  Mayer-Schönberger, for instance, has 
written of the ‘huge digital information treasure’ from which we can retrieve information in an 
instant. On his account, advances in technology have ‘facilitated a culture of creation, 
bricolage, and sharing in which we have abandoned traditional forms of information control.’44 
The result is that we have ‘little incentive to forget’.45 
While the privacy challenges of today appear different to those of the past, we argue 
that the idea of a ‘right to be forgotten’ is rooted in older conceptions of privacy.46 Privacy has 
                                                          
36 On ‘woolly’ concepts in law see D.L. Zimmerman, ‘False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed’ 
(1989) 64 New York University Law Rev. 364, at 369. 
37 H. Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (2010) 21-66. 
38 id.  
39 See generally Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28. 
40 P.L. Bellia, ‘The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law’ (2008) 75 University of Chicago Law Rev. 137.  
41 Indeed, much digital information risks disappearing over time; see, for instance, H. Gladney, Preserving 
Digital Information (2007), Chapter 1. 
42 See, in particular, M. Augé, Oblivion (M de Jager (tr), 2004); J.F. Blanchette and D.G. Johnson, ‘Data 
Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness’ (2002) 18 The Information Society 
33; L.J. Bannon, ‘Forgetting as a Feature, Not a Bug: The Duality of Memory and Implications for Ubiquitous 
Computing’ (2006) 2 CoDesign 3; Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28. 
43 See Bernal, op. cit., n 2; on ‘too much remembering’ see Mayer-Schönberger, id. 
44 Mayer-Schönberger, id. 
45 id. 
46 See, for recent work on privacy as a value in the data protection context, A. Rouvroy and Y. Poullet, ‘The 
Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of 
Privacy for Democracy’ in Gutwirth et al. (eds.), op. cit., n 7; F Ferretti, ‘Data Protection and the Legitimate 
Interest of Data Controllers: Much Ado about Nothing or the Winter of Rights?’ (2014) 51 Common Market 
Law Rev. 843, at 849-851. 
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long been understood as being essential for human personhood and especially important for 
the safeguarding of basic interests in autonomy and dignity.47 Those scholars who advocate 
control-based understandings of privacy emphasise the link between privacy and autonomy.48 
Fried, for example, writes that ‘privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the 
minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.’49 Common 
to control-based accounts is the idea that the individual should be able to take control of her 
private life and, in doing so, decide on its parameters. As for dignity, privacy scholars argue 
that the absence of privacy is degrading.50  Drawing on Warren and Brandeis’ account of 
privacy as ‘inviolate personality’, Bloustein argues that this principle ‘defines man’s essence 
as a unique and self-determining being.’ He contends that ‘[t]he man who is compelled to live 
every minute of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or 
gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human 
dignity.’51 
We argue that both the control-based and dignitarian accounts of privacy underlie what 
has become known as the ‘right to be forgotten’.52 This ‘right’ has a dual nature, as revealed in 
the language used in several other European legal systems. Consider, for example, the German 
and French equivalents, the Recht auf Vergessen or the French droit à l’oubli. As well as the 
individual having an interest in being forgotten by others, these linguistic formulations also 
point to a latent side of the ‘right’: the individual’s own interests in forgetting things from her 
own past.53 Though there is significant conceptual overlap between the two, we will now 
consider each interest in turn as we argue the former gives expression to a control-based 
account of privacy and the latter a dignitarian account. 
 
(a) The interest in being forgotten by others 
 
We mentioned above that control-based accounts of privacy emphasise the connection 
between privacy and autonomy. ‘Normative agency’, in this sense, is important because it feeds 
into identify-formation. 54  Personhood is based on our individual sense of identity or 
ichbewusstsein.55 But the construction of identity is a social as well as a personal process. 
Jaspers understood personality as ‘that mode of being oneself which, in its very nature, cannot 
                                                          
47 J.Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 Yale Law J. 1151. 
48 See, for example, C. Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law J. 475; AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967). 
49 Fried, id., p. 482. 
50 E. Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New York 
University Law Rev. 962; S .Warren and R. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Rev. 193. 
51 Bloustein, id., p. 1003.  
52 In a thoughtful paper about the ‘right to be forgotten’, Andrade links it to the ‘right to identity’ rather than 
privacy. See N. de Andrade, ‘Oblivion: The Right to be Different...from Oneself: Reproposing the Right to be 
Forgotten’ (2012) 13 Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política 122. This approach perhaps makes more sense to 
civilian lawyers familiar with ‘personality rights’. While Andrade provides a compelling argument and we draw 
similar conclusions about the role of search engines in identity formation, we prefer to theorise the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ from a privacy perspective. This is for two reasons. First, we think there are distinct limits as to what 
the law can do in ensuring what Andrade calls the ‘correct projection’ of one’s identity, the nature of which, 
after all, is agent-relative and context-dependent.  (On this point see further P. O’Callaghan, ‘False Privacy and 
Information Games’ (2013) 4 J. of European Tort Law 282). Second, in our view there must be some degree of 
truth (even if outdated) in the information in question if the agent has an interest in forgetting it. In this sense, 
we see the ‘right to be forgotten’, fundamentally, as a metaphor for privacy interests.  
53 On this distinction see further B.J. Koops, ‘Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of 
the “Right to be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice’ (2011) 8 Scripted 229, at 231-232. 
54 Normative agency is our ‘capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life’. See J. 
Griffin, On Human Rights (2008) 44. 
55 On ichbewusstsein see K. Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913). 
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be alone; it is something related, must have something else apart form it: persons and nature.’56 
As social beings, not only do we seek to be accepted by others, we also use others as reference 
points in our personal development, in the same way that a child learns to play a game.57  
Notwithstanding the social aspect of identity-formation, normative agency surely 
requires that the individual exercises some degree of control over various information flows 
that contribute to shaping her identity. As Giddens puts it, she ought to have the ‘capacity to 
keep a particular narrative going’.58 Ordinarily she does this through what Erving Goffman 
calls the ‘information game’. The ‘information game’ is a key feature of social interaction - ‘a 
potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery.’59 In 
other words, social interaction is an inherently dynamic process within which the very identity 
of the individual is shaped. We routinely engage, Goffman argues, in ‘audience segregation’: 
we display different ‘fronts’ or we ‘play different parts’ depending on the individual or group 
with whom we are interacting.60 In the digital environment, this explains why internet users 
often have multiple profiles when using the internet. These allow users to ‘present appropriate 
facets of themselves to others, understood as assuming a variety of roles in these respective 
contexts.’61 So, the individual may have one profile for her social media account, another for 
leaving comments on a newspaper’s website and another still for a dating website.62  
However, playing an ‘information game’ becomes more difficult online. This can be 
attributed, at least in part, to the blurring of traditional distinctions between the public and 
private spheres in the online context. For instance, when a user of a social networking site such 
as Twitter posts information online there is normally some level of awareness that the material 
is ‘online’ and thus ‘public’ but in many cases the target readership comprises of friends, 
colleagues, close relatives, and so on. But, without the proper privacy controls, this information 
will be picked up by Google and other search engines. An online search, then, has the potential 
to instantaneously create a collage of information about an individual’s personal life.63 The 
playing of ‘information games’ is further complicated by the fact that search engine results 
publish not only information made available by that individual, but also information made 
available about that individual: the version of us presented by search engines consequently may 
differ radically from the version we ideally would present of ourselves in different situations. 
The individual can no longer exercise control over personal information in the way she would 
have done when engaging in an ‘information game’ in the pre-digital world.   
If Google and similar search engines are indeed increasingly becoming our windows to 
the world,64 then they have a profoundly important part to play in identity formation in the 21st 
century. Understood in this way, search engines are much more than simply repositories of 
information; rather they are active forces in identity formation. But, importantly, search engines 
make it more difficult for the individual to engage effectively in ‘information games’. This has 
profound implications for her ‘capacity to keep a particular narrative going’ and thus 
undermines individual autonomy. Furthermore, search engines prioritize certain types of 
sources in their rankings: information published in newspapers will generally be listed higher 
                                                          
56 P.A, Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (1957) 263. 
57 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, & Society (1934). 
58 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (1991) 54. 
59 E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) 20. 
60 id., p. 57.  
61 Nissenbaum, op. cit., n 37, p. 229. 
62 See, similarly, J. Powles and L. Floridi, ‘A manifesto for the future of the “right to be forgotten” debate’ 
Guardian, 22 July 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/22/a-manifesto-for-the-future-of-
the-right-to-be-forgotten-debate>; Koops, op. cit., n 53, p. 250, on ‘clean slate’ social norms. 
63 On ‘digital collages’, see Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28, p. 124. 
64 See J. van Hoboken, Search Engine Freedom (2012). 
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than any information that is self-published, making so-called ‘online reputation management’ 
a daunting if not impossible task for individual data subjects.65  
Restoring, to some degree, the individual’s ability to engage in information games is 
what we mean when we say that she has interests in being forgotten by others. We will explore 
what this might mean in practice later in the paper but for now we turn to consider the other 
aspect of the ‘right to be forgotten’. 
 
(b) The interest in forgetting 
 
The first aspect of the ‘right to be forgotten’, being forgotten by others, gives expression 
to a control-based understanding of privacy while the second, which we now examine, 
emphasises dignity. Of course there is a significant conceptual overlap between the first and 
second aspects as, in Kantian terms, autonomy is the ‘ground for the dignity of human nature’.66 
But the second aspect speaks more to the traditional dignitarian account as espoused by privacy 
scholars.67 As Mayer-Schönberger has put it, the capacity to forget is an essential part of what 
makes us human. Being constantly confronted with one’s past is potentially degrading and thus 
can undermine human dignity.68 
That our capacity to forget is a necessary component of human agency is an old idea. 
Nietzsche, for instance, draws our attention to the value of living ‘unhistorically’. For him, 
forgetting is important because it ensures happiness, however brief the moment.69 He warns 
that if we cannot forget, the past risks becoming ‘the gravedigger of the present.’70 In the same 
way, Kundera attempts to contemplate the sheer horror of an existence in which one is unable 
to forget. Such a person, he writes, ‘would be nothing like human beings: neither his loves nor 
his friendships nor his angers nor his capacity to forgive or avenge would resemble ours.’71 
This is because forgetting is ‘part of the essence of man’.72 
Though the importance of forgetting for human agency is an old idea, it is more relevant 
now than ever before. We talk of information technology being pervasive or ubiquitous.73 
Indeed, for most in the developed world, online connectivity is no longer a novelty because we 
are constantly connected. Where there is excessive remembering the past may become 
overbearing. Old emails, our browsing history and old correspondence on social networking 
websites are accessible in an instant. We can use the internet to churn up old memories but 
because they come all at once they threaten to overwhelm and disorient us.74 Because forgetting 
                                                          
65 For an account of reputation management in practice, see T. Dowling, ‘Search me: online reputation 
management’ Guardian, 24 May 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/may/24/search-me-
online-reputation-management>. 
66 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (ed. M. Gregor, 2011) 43. 
67 See, for example, Bloustein, op. cit., n 50, p. 1003. 
68 See, similarly, O.J. Gstrein, ‘The cascade of decaying information: putting the “right to be forgotten” in 
perspective’ (2015) 21 Computer and Telecommunications Law Rev. 40, at 43-44. 
69 F. Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ in Untimely Meditations, ed. D. Breazeale 
(1997) 59-63. 
70 id., p. 62. 
71 M. Kundera, Ignorance (L Asher (tr), 2002) 123. 
72 id. 
73 The idea of ubiquitous computing is not new. Those who have embraced this idea advocate embedding 
computers into our everyday activities and the objects that we use. As well as placing emphasis on the 
‘invisibility’ of technology so that it remains ‘mundane and routine’, they seek to ensure that the technology is 
‘smart’ so that it ‘adds value’. See M. Dodge and R. Kitchin ‘Outlines of a World coming into Existence: 
Pervasive Computing and the Ethics of Forgetting’ (2007) 34 Environment and Planning B: Planning and 
Design 431, at 431. 
74 Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28, p. 123. 
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is necessary for human agency, excessive remembering obstructs human flourishing. 75  It 
represents the Nietzschean nightmare of the past becoming the grave-digger of the present, a 
past from which we are unable to escape.  
 
3. The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ and the Public Good of Universal Accessibility of Information  
 
The first reason why the ‘right to be forgotten’ is helpful as a metaphor is because we 
reveal contemporary privacy-related challenges once we contrast the ‘right’ with the metaphor 
of digital technology’s ‘perfect memory’.  At the same time, we have argued that the idea of 
the ‘right to be forgotten’ is rooted in the older and more familiar control-based and dignitarian 
accounts of privacy. In this sense, though Google Spain and other recent cases76 represent 
another step in society’s ongoing reformulation of what privacy means, this reformulation is 
not as radical as it first appears. 
We now turn to consider the second reason why the metaphor of a ‘right to be forgotten’ 
is helpful. Because the terminology is instinctively contentious, it draws our attention to the 
potential implications of data erasure for the freedom to receive information and freedom of 
expression, rights integral to every democratic society. In this light, it is worth quoting a 
passage from the Advocate General’s opinion in Google Spain:  
 
‘In fact, universal accessibility of information on the internet relies on internet search engines, because finding 
relevant information without them would be too complicated and difficult, and would produce limited results. As 
the referring court rightly observes, acquiring information about announcements on the forced sale of the data 
subject's property would previously have required a visit to the archives of the newspaper. Now this information 
can be acquired by typing his name into an internet search engine and this makes the dissemination of such data 
considerably more efficient, and at the same time, more disturbing for the data subject.’77 
 
Once we accept universal accessibility of information as an important public good it is easy to 
see how the AG arrived at these conclusions. But this begs the immediate question as to how 
we reconcile the public good of universal accessibility of information with interests in 
forgetting/being forgotten.  
This question is an especially important one for our argument because up to now we 
have focussed on the interests of the individual in forgetting/being forgotten. But what is 
ultimately determined to be an appropriate use of information does not turn solely on the wishes 
of the individual but is also informed by social norms generally. It is against this backdrop that 
we now turn to consider Nissenbaum’s theory of ‘contextual integrity’, which sheds light on 
the question of reconciling the public good of universal accessibility of information with 
interests in forgetting/being forgotten.     
 
NISSENBAUM’S THEORY OF CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY 
 
1. Informational Norms and Contextual Integrity 
 
Nissenbaum stresses the sheer variety and complexity of our expectations about the 
flow of information. These expectations are ‘systematically related to characteristics of the 
background social situation.’78 In other words, social interaction is complex – in order to 
understand the dynamic of the interaction we must always take into account the particular 
                                                          
75 id., p. 125. 
76 C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Vidal Hall and Ors v Google [2014] EWHC 
13 (QB). 
77 AG Opinion in Google Spain, op. cit., n 8, para 45. 
78 Nissenbaum, op. cit., n 37, p. 129. 
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context of the interaction. Understood in this way, we interact within a variety of ‘structured 
social settings’ that have developed over time. Not only do these ‘social spheres’ have different 
origins, they are also subject to a range of ‘contingencies of purpose, place, culture, historical 
accident and more.’79 
Nissenbaum builds her theory of contextual integrity in a framework of ‘informational 
norms’. Contextual integrity is ‘preserved when informational norms are respected and violated 
when informational norms are breached.’80 These informational norms have evolved over time. 
They ‘have been finely calibrated to support goals, purposes, and values of social life and 
kinship, such as trust, accommodation, unconditional regard, and loyalty.’ 81  New norms 
emerge and existing norms are reshaped, but there is always a ‘tension’ between our 
‘entrenched social structures and practices’ and the ‘forward-pulling forces of technology.’82 
What is appropriate or inappropriate use of personal information depends on existing 
informational norms. These norms are both backward-looking and forward-looking as 
Nissenbaum recognises. They are backward-looking in the sense that they find their origins in 
the pre-digital age. Allowing space for forgetting and/or to be forgotten by others has been a 
key feature of our social structures and practices that have evolved over time. As Mayer-
Schönberger reminds us: 
 
‘For centuries, moving from one community to another permitted people to restart their lives with a clean slate, 
as information about them stayed local. Crossing the Atlantic from Europe to the newly founded United States...let 
people start from scratch, not just in economic terms, but more importantly in terms of knowledge others had of 
them. Even moving from one neighbourhood to another in a large city might achieve a similar result. In a sense, 
such moves were akin to declaring information bankruptcy; one could restart again in control of one’s personal 
information.’83 
 
The idea of a fresh start in this sense forms a profoundly important part of our cultural memory. 
Indeed, the idea of making a break with the past is so engrained that, as Halavais points out, it 
has become ‘almost ritualized’.84 So we talk about ‘new year’s resolutions’, ‘starting out on a 
new career path’, or using the transition from secondary school to university as an opportunity 
to ‘reinvent oneself’.85  
 Yet, at the same time, our informational norms are forward-looking, ready to be shaped 
by new technological developments. Nissenbaum thinks that people will learn to adapt but 
‘these adjustments will not be radical and they will be tempered by explicit and implicit respect’ 
for the informational norms already entrenched in our social structures and practices.86 Thus, 
we have reason to dispute Mark Zuckerberg’s remarks that privacy ‘is no longer a social 
norm’.87  
 
2. Ensuring an Appropriate Flow of Information 
 
                                                          
79 id., p. 130. 
80 id., p. 140. 
81 id., p. 229. 
82 id.. 
83 Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28, p. 99. 
84 A. Halavais, Search Engine Society (2009) 11, 145. 
85 Halavais, id.; see also Zittrain: ‘Like personal financial bankruptcy, or the way in which a state often seals a 
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idea of a second or third chance into our digital space.’  (J. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet, and How to Stop 
It (2008) 228-229.) 
86 Nissenbaum, op. cit., n 37, p. 229. 




For Nissenbaum, the battle for privacy is not a battle about being able to erase 
information at will from the internet. Rather she argues that ‘the right to privacy is neither a 
right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate flow of personal information.’88 
What individuals find most disturbing is when there is a ‘clash of contexts’ resulting in an 
inappropriate flow of information. 89  These are cases where people ‘have understood 
themselves to be operating in one context and governed by the norms of that context, only to 
find that others have taken them to be operating in a different one.’90 This might take place 
where other actors ‘divert’ information flows in an ‘unexpected’ way and this diversion thus 
breaches informational norms. This is an important point because, as we have already 
mentioned, traditional distinctions between the public and private spheres have become blurred 
in the online context. Understood in this way, older informational norms have been 
reformulated and new norms have emerged. So, by means of illustration, a clash of contexts 
emerges when an employer obtains via Facebook information about an employee’s socialising 
habits where these activities have no impact on the employee carrying out his duties.91 
Understood in this way, Nissenbaum’s idea of a ‘clash of contexts’ is not unlike 
Goffman’s thoughts about ‘audience segregation.’ An integral part of the ‘information game’ 
is the individual’s ability to display different ‘fronts’ in different contexts. But what amounts 
to an appropriate or inappropriate flow of information should not be left entirely to the 
individual to decide. This is because some of our informational norms stem from deeply 
engrained convictions in society about the ‘public interest’ or the ‘common good’. Mr. 
Costeja’s complaint in Google Spain is a neat illustration of this point. Here information about 
a real-estate auction of his property, prompted by Mr. Costeja’s social security debts, was 
legitimately reported by the Spanish newspaper. It was legitimate because the information was 
relevant news at the time it was originally reported, in the public interest and the newspaper 
clearly had both a duty and a right to publish it. Within the framework of informational norms 
existing in a modern democracy, this surely amounts to an appropriate flow of information and 
thus the principle of contextual integrity is not offended. In some cases, then, the individual 
may wish to engage in ‘audience segregation’ but the informational norm of the public interest 
trumps the individual’s wishes. However, in the Google Spain case, a ‘clash of contexts’ 
emerged (and the principle of contextual integrity was thus offended) once a link to the 
newspaper report became one of the first results to come up about Mr. Costeja in a Google 
search of his name years later. There was a clash of contexts because, despite the passage of 
time, Mr. Costeja’s very identity was being shaped by Google searches and this process was to 
continue indefinitely. Mr. Costeja’s capacity to engage in information games was thus greatly 
reduced.  
If we accept the need for contextual integrity, then, it cannot follow that all information 
should be made easily and instantaneously available. Where there is an appropriate flow of 
information (according to existing informational norms, including those stemming from the 
public interest), there are good reasons to make such information generally available. But 
where this information flow is inappropriate, there are sound arguments for requiring some 
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intent on the part of the researcher to find the information. Sometimes, then, contextual 
integrity demands that intent is required to obtain certain types of information. Understood in 
this way, it should be more difficult to obtain the type of information that would have been 
buried in the archives in the pre-internet era.92 Again, this does not mean that this information 
should be impossible to access. For all sorts of reasons, historians and journalists, for example, 
may need to access such information in the future. Moreover, this is not an argument to return 
to the physical archives of the past. Rather, this argument simply states that if we are to allow 
sufficient space for forgetting in the digital era then some information should not become 
instantly available by putting a person’s name into a search engine. In the case of Mr. Costeja, 
contextual integrity could have been preserved had the information about his past social 
security debts been available in a section of the website of the newspaper but the link to this 
information was not instantaneously associated with a search for only his name, without any 
qualifiers, on a search engine. This was what the Spanish tribunal had recommended and what 
the ECJ decision amounts to in effect.  
No doubt there will be those who will remain uneasy about such an argument for the 
reasons we outline in the opening paragraph of this paper. But we would attempt to reassure 
such readers by emphasising that this argument is not one that seeks to have information erased 
from the internet, in the sense of outright data deletion. Rather, the argument is that sometimes 
it better to obtain ‘limited’ or, as we will argue, ‘reordered’ results from a search engine as long 
as this preserves contextual integrity. In short, it is an argument that recognises the special 
status of search engines in the digital age. 
The decision in Google Spain thus does something that is in our view paramount: by 
giving expression to interests in forgetting/being forgotten, it forces us to reconsider our 
understanding of privacy and its interaction with the freedom to access information in ways 
that are valuable for the digital age.  We have argued that a ‘right to be forgotten’, in the sense 
elaborated in section 3 above, has the potential to be a useful metaphor in conceptualising 
contextual integrity on the internet. However, though its development can be defended in 
principle, any ‘right’ seeking to achieve contextual integrity must be delineated and 
implemented in an appropriate way. Before we conclude, we will examine some of the 
shortcomings of the Court’s judgment and propose how, in practice, the principles that underlie 
a ‘right to be forgotten’ can be given effect through functional, procedural remedies. 
 
GOOGLE SPAIN AND CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY 
 
1. Shortcomings of the Judgment  
 
While most commentary acknowledges that Google Spain established a ‘right to delist’ 
certain internet search results,93  rather than a ‘right to be forgotten’, criticism of the Court’s 
findings has all the same been pervasive since it issued its judgment in May 2014.  Reasons for 
academic critique range from principled opposition to any form of ‘censorship’94 to more 
general questions as to whether it is appropriate to charge a private party, with clear commercial 
                                                          
92 On a Lakoff and Johnson analysis, the metaphorical use of the verb ‘to bury’ in the phrase ‘to bury something 
in the archives’ tells us much about our shared understanding of what should happen to information that 
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94 See J. Zittrain, ‘Don’t Force Google to “Forget”’ New York Times, 14 May 2014 < 
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interests, with balancing very sensitive and competing human rights when such balancing is a 
struggle even for courts.95  Legal scholars have been particularly critical of the judgment’s own 
weighing of the competing rights, with James observing that the decision ‘leans firmly (almost 
to the point of falling over) on the side of the right of privacy…’.96  Frantziou adds to this a 
critical comparison of Google Spain with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In Wegrzynowski, the ECtHR found that ‘particularly strong reasons must be provided 
for any measure limiting access to information which the public has a right to receive.’97 
Frantziou notes that any assessment of the impact of a ‘right to delist’ on the competing rights 
to freedom of expression and information is ‘starkly missing’ from Google Spain. 98 
Furthermore, concern has also been expressed about the fact that Google’s process of handling 
requests is couched in secrecy.99  A July 2015 data leak of Google’s responses to requests 
suggests that the bulk of the requests relate to clearly ‘private’ information, but sheds no 
particular light on Google’s actual processes of handling requests.100  
Of most interest given the focus of this article, however, is the criticism that has been 
levelled against the substantive ‘delisting’ criteria that the ECJ unearthed from the Data 
Protection Directive.  Commentators have flagged up that hinging a ‘delisting’ request on the 
‘relevance’ of data is very problematic, as relevance is contextual: information about a fourteen 
year old child today may become information about the UK prime minister in 40 years’ time, 
and an old bankruptcy notice such as Mr. Costeja’s may once again become ‘relevant’ if he 
encounters further financial difficulty.101 A search engine like Google making ‘relevance’ 
determinations is particularly controversial, as search engines organise information in light of 
their own business interests.102  A search engine that simply produced a value-neutral list of 
results without ordering them would be unusable; its results would simply not be ‘relevant’ to 
most of its users, at which point its profits (rooted in the amount of usage it attracts) would 
dwindle.103  Google’s search algorithm consequently tracks popularity of pages as a specific 
measure of ‘relevance’. There is no guaranteeing that private information will not be popular, 
and consequently of public interest, in Google’s view; Google therefore must be told explicitly 
how concepts such as ‘relevance’ and ‘preponderant interest’ are to be interpreted.  
The EU’s Article 29 Working Party, an EU-level advisory body composed of national 
DPA representatives, has issued guidance to search engines on when to ‘delist’.  However, it 
is significantly hampered in its attempts to provide detailed guidance by the sparsity of the 
Court’s reasoning.  In Google Spain, terms such as ‘relevance’, ‘preponderant interest’ and 
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‘public life’ are presented as if they either fully apply or do not apply.  Given that starting point, 
there is limited scope for the Working Party’s guidance on the judgment to take into account 
context-dependent gradations of ‘relevance’ and ‘interest’.  It is clear that the guidance attempts 
to consider informational context in a more explicit manner than the judgment did: it embraces 
that, for instance, information about children is more likely to require ‘delisting’ than identical 
information about adults would be.104  However, the guidance generally merely alludes to 
contextual considerations that search engines may wish to consider—such as ‘age of the 
information’—without setting down benchmarks that search engine decision-making can be 
measured against.  This will not greatly help search engines in processing ‘delisting’ requests 
where the indexed information may be slightly relevant, or of some public interest.  The 
guidance, in short, is too general; but that generality is an inevitable consequence of Google 
Spain, which established a very broad remedy. 
The ECJ in Google Spain, then, has set out too little in its judgment that will safeguard 
the contextually relevant balancing of the rights to information and the right to privacy. While 
we stand by the idea that not all information on the internet needs to remain instantly accessible 
indefinitely, Google Spain establishes a procedural remedy that does not necessarily ensure 
that information flows appropriately in the way that contextual integrity demands.  
 
2. In Defence of Google Spain 
 
We would argue, however, that criticism of the judgment must itself be contextualized.  
It must be remembered that in many ways, Google Spain is a blunt-force application of a 
Directive from 1995 to the 2014 internet.  As the AG astutely notes, it was drafted at a time 
when it was not yet conceivable that the internet would become a ‘comprehensive global stock 
of information which is universally accessible and searchable.’105  It is not equipped to cope 
with the effects that search engines have had on the rights at stake in the Google Spain case: 
information is more readily available and data subject privacy has become more complicated 
to guarantee than was ever deemed possible in 1995.  The judgment thus works with outdated 
concepts that suggest that personal data is available online in a limited manner that can be 
easily controlled by a single data controller—an idea that seems a little naïve in the Google 
age.106   
What most commentators have not stressed enough in our view is that the alternative 
to finding a ‘right to delist’ would have been to conclude that under the current interplay 
between the Data Protection Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, internet users 
in the EU simply cannot exercise any degree of control over the picture that Google paints of 
them.  They may have had data protection rights in a more general sense, but they would have 
no particular power to act against search engines, who previously believed themselves to only 
be information ‘intermediaries’, not generally subject to EU data protection law.107  
This would have been a very problematic conclusion, fixed on an interpretation of what 
search engines do that is as outdated as the Directive.  As stressed above, Google does not 
simply ‘list’; it constructs online identities of data subjects without their input.  When 
information about a data subject is available online, Google will ‘crawl’ it, index it, and then 
rank it according to its mysterious algorithms. Data ‘ranking’ has particular identity-
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constructing implications, which Google Spain addresses for the first time.108  Mr. Costeja was 
unable to play an effective ‘information game’; his identity was set in stone by Google’s search 
ranking of an old newspaper clipping that had his name in it.  Though that information was 
clearly ‘relevant’ and of public interest in 1998, and thus legitimately made available in one 
context, it was years later being reproduced by Google without the same prima facie 
‘relevance’ or public interest.  The end result was that Mr. Costeja could not engage in 
‘audience segregation’ because his audience already possessed information about him, despite 
the prima facie irrelevance of that information to the public. In this way, the presence of the 
link in the search engine results offended contextual integrity. 
In short, without the ability to somehow address the identity-constructing that search 
results engage in, identity-related aspects of the right to privacy were definitely not adequately 
protected by EU law before Google Spain.  The judgment thus engages with outdated law in a 
forward-looking way, making clear that the modern internet does not have to mean a 
degradation of dignity.109 Nonetheless, the judgment—restrained by both the legal terminology 
of the pre-Google era and a very specific referred question—is premised on an 
oversimplification of the difficult relationship between the human rights at stake in the Google 
era.  In exclusively considering the potential removal of a particular search result, the judgment 
paints a picture of the public’s relationship to Google as being a very fixed, binary one: either 
Google respects our privacy and so it ‘delists’, or it does not.  The reality of Google’s 
functioning is more complicated, in a way that the judgment simply cannot grapple with given 
the limitations of the Data Protection Directive.  Google does not simply ‘forget’ or 
‘remember’, nor does it simply produce a plain catalogue of all available information when a 
search term is entered: its ‘ranking’ process is not neutral, and does not necessarily pay heed 
to the context surrounding information that it indexes.110  As Pasquale has said, ‘Search results 
pages are a messy ground of contestation, influenced by search-engine optimizers, engineers 
within Google, paid ads, human reviewers of proposed algorithm changes, and many other 
factors.’ 111  What this means is that data subjects cannot simply assume that the flow of 
information pertaining to them respects contextual integrity once it is indexed and presented as 
a search result by Google. 
 
3. Contextualizing the Google Spain Right 
 
The ultimate battle fought by Mr. Costeja concerned the ease with which information 
about him could be accessed, on a search of only his name, through Google.  The Court’s 
solution was to make the information harder to find by simply not having it indexed.  While 
the media frenzy surrounding Google Spain has meant that Mr. Costeja did not personally 
benefit from the established remedy, such a remedy will serve the purpose of future individuals 
in similar situations.112  However, Mr. Costeja’s is an extreme example of how Google shapes 
identity. In many more instances, while the information presented by Google may not result in 
                                                          
108 See European Union Committee, op. cit., n 101, p. 15, quoting C Scott. 
109 This is broadly in line with the ECtHR’s interpretation of the right the privacy, which encompasses ‘the right 
to establish details of their identity as individual human beings’; see Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 
28957/95 (ECHR 11 July 2002) para 90; Pretty v United Kingdom App no 2346/02 (ECHR 29 April 2002) para 
62; Mikulić v. Croatia App no 53176/99 (ECHR 7 February 2002) para 53. 
110 Halavais, op. cit., n 84, pp. 103-105. 
111 As quoted in J. Sadowski, ‘Lessons from the “right to be forgotten”’ The Hill, 1 June 2014 
<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/207841-lessons-from-the-right-to-be-forgotten>. 
112 Commentators have correctly observed that Mr. Costeja’s bankruptcy is, as a result of Google Spain, less 
‘forgotten’ than it has ever been – but his is likely one of very few high-profile cases to surface now that a 
remedy to ‘delist’ is accessible directly from search engines. 
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constant negative personal repercussions, it will nonetheless be perceived by data subjects as 
more or less relevant to them at differing points in time.   
Our concern about Google Spain is that, in introducing ‘delisting’ as the only remedy 
to data ‘relevancy’ problems, the case establishes a one-size-fits-all approach to highly variable 
situations. It is not unlike holding that when earlier work experience is no longer relevant to a 
current job application, it forever disappears from a CV.  This fully ignores that there may be 
context-dependent degrees of ‘irrelevant’, and that these may vary over time.  What data 
subjects have lost with the advent of search engines and web 2.0, and what they ideally would 
regain, is assurance that the internet presents information about them in a manner that society—
rather than Google’s algorithm—finds contextually appropriate.  Google Spain remedies this 
situation to an extent, but not necessarily in all situations. 
For some data, such as data pertaining to a teenager’s ‘youthful indiscretions’ or any 
person’s ‘spent’ legal troubles, our societal expectations are in fact those of a clean slate: we 
socially and legally accept that certain experiences we undergo are consigned to history, and 
should not be automatically associated with an individual by name for the remainder of their 
lives.113  An example of this in UK legislation is the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.  The 
UK Supreme Court in T and Anor in 2014 confirmed, amongst other things, that disclosing two 
bicycle thefts at age eleven every time the now-adult respondent applied for a position that 
involved interaction with children was an unnecessary (and thus unjustified) intervention with 
his private life.114  ‘Delisting’ search results that pertain to this type of information appears to 
respect contextual integrity, but is not the only possible remedy to clashes of contexts.   
Alternative ways of preserving contextual integrity have been proposed both prior to 
and in the aftermath of the Google Spain judgment.  Mayer-Schönberger, for instance, has long 
advocated for the automatic expiration of information, which could be extended to an 
expiration of search results; this would be one way of mimicking ‘memory’ on the internet.115   
However, such an approach preferences privacy over the right to information as a default, if 
enough time has lapsed.  This will not always be contextually appropriate, and is therefore not 
an improvement to ‘delisting’. 
A different solution has been proposed by Powles and Floridi, who have argued for a 
‘comment’ function on search results, enabling data subjects to provide context to the 
information about them.116  As a remedy, this ‘comment’ function would preserve freedom of 
information to the full extent, while enabling the data subject to play some form of an 
‘information game’.  However, it fails to achieve what Mr. Costeja actually sought to obtain 
from Google, and what many others will desire: a decrease in focus on certain bits of 
information, because their relevance has diminished with time.  A comment on Google’s search 
results from Mr. Costeja, explaining that the newspaper notices in question were no longer 
relevant, would do little to negate the first impression created by the existence of those notices 
on the first page of search engine results.  The explanation would merely offer a ‘defence’ of 
sorts – but the argument made by Mr. Costeja, which we believe to be entirely valid, is that he 
should not be made to ‘defend’ twelve year old behaviour for the rest of his life simply because 
Google has ranked this information as relevant. A ‘comment’ function remedy would thus 
preference the right to information over the right to privacy, as the original information would 
never disappear; again, this may not always be contextually appropriate. 
What Google Spain has demonstrated a need for is a remedy that acknowledges that the 
relevance of information varies with the passage of time, and search engine results for plain 
                                                          
113 Stuart, op. cit., n 10, pp. 509-510; de Andrade, op. cit., n 52, p. 133; Section 3 above. 
114 R (on the application of T and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
another (Appellants) [2014] UKSC 35, para 142 (Lord Reed). 
115 Mayer-Schönberger, op. cit., n 28. 
116 Powles and Floridi, op. cit., n 62. 
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name searches of individuals should reflect such variance.  Consider, for instance, information 
that is not necessarily harmful or prejudicial to the data subject, the way that a reminder of a 
twelve year old bankruptcy would be, but information that is simply of lesser relevance to that 
data subject; information that may not be offensive, but nonetheless would not make the first 
page of someone’s CV or the first hour of conversation with a new acquaintance.117  We would 
argue that such information should also not appear on the first page of Google’s search results 
for a data subject’s name, but does not need to be ‘delisted’ and thus disassociated with that 
person’s name forever.  As Zittrain notes, ‘the second page [of search results] … might as well 
be in Siberia’. 118  If few internet users will look past the first page of results, this suggests that 
the most ‘relevant’ information should be on this page, and less ‘relevant’ information should 
be less visible.  A means of achieving this kind of contextual integrity in search results is, as 
Stuart has persuasively set out in the US context, enabling data subjects to request a 
‘reordering’ of Google search results produced for their name.119  Introducing a ‘reordering’ 
remedy alongside the existing ‘delisting’ remedy established by Google Spain would permit 
users to indicate what information, on a plain search of their name, is more and less relevant 
about them at any given point in time, as well as (where information warrants this) requesting 
for certain information to simply not appear at all anymore.  
A ‘right to reorder’ would not need to result in permanent, static search engine result 
editing: while a request could trigger a ‘downranking’ of information, Google’s PageRank 
algorithm could thereafter continue to apply to it, meaning that if a particular piece of online 
information becomes more ‘relevant’ with time again (as measured by search popularity, or 
perhaps cross-referencing in other online sources), it would move back up on the search results 
pages – in an automated analogy to someone amending their CV in light of the ‘essential 
criteria’ in a particular job application.   
A potential criticism of a ‘reordering’ of search results would be a lack of transparency 
in the actual reordering process; while ‘delisting’ is a clear process from the perspective of the 
publisher, ‘reordering’ requires changes to the Google algorithm that will be as couched in 
secrecy as the algorithm itself.  However, while ‘reordering’ as a remedy may have less clear 
consequences for publishers and information seekers, it also has less extreme consequences for 
these parties than ‘delisting’ does.  For that reason, we would argue that it balances these 
competing rights in a generally preferable way even if slightly less transparent.    
The role of the Article 29 Working Group would be key in establishing ‘reordering’ as 
a remedy: its guidance would need to set out the relationship between the context of given 
information about data subjects, and the extent of reordering required of the search engine in 
light of that context.  The flexibility offered by a request to reorder, as well as its non-static 
application, would ensure a far greater degree of contextual integrity in information flows than 
the binary of keeping or ‘delisting’ established by Google Spain.  Any ensuing Working 
Group’s guidance, drafted as the outcome an EU-wide debate amongst DPAs of societal 
expectations surrounding data privacy, would be able to explicitly consider gradation of terms 
such as ‘relevance’ and ‘preponderant interest’ in a way that its current guidance cannot, 
because this additional remedy can represent different degrees of ‘relevance’ and 
‘preponderant interest’ of information.  Such guidance would also shed light on the ‘reordering’ 
process itself, addressing the transparency concerns highlighted above by establishing 
benchmarks for Google’s ‘reordering’ choices.  
The fact that search engines are likely to announce that they are ‘reordering’ 
information, in the same way that Google now notifies users that some results may not show 
                                                          
117 See, for similar considerations, P Korenhof et al., op. cit., n 7, p. 192. 
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as a consequence of Google Spain, is unlikely to cause significant problems when it comes to 
preserving the right to privacy.  While ‘reordering’ may have a certain novelty factor when it 
is first announced—and may thus result in users assessing far more search results pages than 
they ordinarily would—the fact that it is a general notice, applicable to all name searches 
regardless of whether they are subject to ‘reorder’ or ‘delisting’ requests, suggests that after 
perhaps a few cursory attempts to see if there are any ‘interesting’ results on later pages, most 
users would return to ordinary search behaviour.  After all, over 95% of EU-based Google 
searches continue to originate from localised Google search domains for their particular 
country, meaning users have not switched to using Google.com instead, even though Google 
suggests that that is where the real interesting search results now live.120 
Practical objections to a right to ‘reordering’ are likely to be similar to objections to the 
development of a ‘right to be forgotten’.  However, Google Spain has already conferred an 
obligation for Google to engage with any data subject on a case-by-case basis where they 
believe a search of their name produces inaccurate or out of date information, and it has proved 
capable of doing so administratively and willing—despite initial protests—to ‘edit’ its search 
engine results to comply with the law.121  What we argue for is a more ‘nuanced’ approach to 
addressing search engine obligations. The EU legislator, by merely codifying a ‘right to 
erasure’ in the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation, missed an opportunity to 
specifically address the increasingly significant role that search engines play in identity 
formation for most data subjects.122  In requiring search engines to process both ‘delisting’ 
requests and ‘reordering’ requests, we argue that the right to privacy of data subjects will be 
better protected, and freedom of information will also be better preserved.  ‘Delisting’ ideally 
would occur only when contextual integrity suggests that information has to be fully 
disassociated from an individual’s name; it should function as the exceptional remedy, 
reflecting that there are only limited types of information that impact on private life where there 
is a societal expectation of complete ‘erasure’.123  Where this very high standard cannot be met, 
reordering will nonetheless enable the data subject to play an ‘information game’, restructuring 
their online identity as it develops and thus preserving their right to privacy in a contextually 
appropriate manner.  Either type of request will require Google to make difficult judgments of 
when information is ‘relevant’ or what the public interest is, and the Article 29 Working Group 
and the EU legislator should spend a substantial amount of time considering what conditions 
should apply for either type of request to be successful.124  This will undoubtedly not be a 
simple task, but unless privacy and the freedom to access information actually cease to be a 
social norms that we wish to safeguard, it is a necessary step to make data protection rights 
workable in the future. 125   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
                                                          
120 The Advisory Council, op. cit., n 93, p. 19. 
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The ‘right to be forgotten’ has attracted a significant amount of criticism, much of it 
stemming from dissatisfaction with the terminology. As Zimmerman forcefully argued some 
years ago, ‘woolly’ concepts have no place in our laws.126 Most of the critics of the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ would appear to concur. 
 We have argued, however, that the ‘right’ can be put to good use as a metaphor. This 
metaphor helps us better understand not just the new and emerging privacy concerns of the 
digital age but also how these concerns impact on the public good of universal accessibility of 
information.  
 Once we pay attention to the dual nature of the ‘right’ we see that fundamental interests 
in autonomy and dignity are at stake. In particular, while the construction of identity is a social 
as well as a personal process, we have argued that playing an ‘information game’ in Goffman’s 
sense is increasingly difficult online but no less necessary. Restoring, to some degree, the 
ability to engage in information games on the internet is what a proper development of the 
‘right’ would accomplish. To borrow Koops’ expression, Google Spain ‘provides a glimmer 
of hope’ for regaining some degree of control over the various information flows that shape 
our identities. 127  
 We have emphasised too that Nissenbaum’s idea of contextual integrity provides us 
with important insights about the ‘right to be forgotten’ and its relationship with the freedom 
to access information. Rather than think solely in terms of a binary of remembering and 
forgetting (that is, either we keep the information or we erase it), we argue that it is better to 
question instead whether there is an appropriate flow of information. Understood in this way, 
it is not necessarily the case that the best way to ensure contextual integrity in a given case is 
to erase search engine results. Indeed, we have argued that the erasure tool should be available 
only in those cases where there is a societal expectation of a ‘clean slate’. Where this high 
threshold is not met, reordering the information might appropriately balance data subject 
privacy and freedom of information. Offering two potential remedies rather than one would be 
no easier to implement than Google Spain’s ‘right to delist’ or the General Data Protection 
Regulation’s ‘right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”)’—but crucially, it would also not be 
more difficult. At the same time, we would argue that the upshot is that such a solution would 
be better able to ensure contextual integrity, to safeguard interests in privacy as well as the 
freedom to access information.  
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